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The article provides an analysis of the “problem” approach to understanding a human being. 
This approach was a characteristic feature of the followers of empiriocriticism in Russia at the 
turn of the 20th century. It is shown that this approach suggests the possibility of a procedural 
understanding of the objectness of philosophical knowledge which in turn requires the 
metaphysical rationality to be critically overcome. Russian positivism is discussed by means of 
analyzing the two main “irritants” of the philosophical tradition: antimetaphysical pathos and 
a new model of knowledge. Metaphysics, as an object of criticism of the Russian positivists, 
was considered to be a special strategy of comprehending absolute truth, or such a system of 
knowledge that was based on ignorance, that is, on a whole series of assumptions accepted on 
faith and never verified. It is shown that the criticism of metaphysics led the empiriocritics 
to develop their own alternative projects to prove the possibility of monistic philosophy. The 
most interesting experiments of constructing a system of “non-metaphysical all-unity” were 
the theories of empiriomonism and tektology of Aleksandr Bogdanov, scientific philosophy 
of Vladimir Lesevich, empiriosymbolism of Pavel Yushkevich, philosophy of life of Sergey 
Suvorov, as well as positive aesthetics of Aleksandr Lunacharsky. These theories are considered 
in the context of modelling a system of new, non-classical, or de-anthropologized, philosophical 
knowledge. The problem of man is described by means of both destruction and actualization 
of its main historical interpretations. The thesis of the Russian positivists that philosophy can 
exist only in the form of a historico-philosophical discourse which is held to create a possible 
reality rather than to reconstruct the existing philosophical doctrines is corroborated.
Keywords: Russian philosophy, empiriocriticism, positivism, problem of man, subject, 
destruction of subjectivity, constructing a man, de-anthropologized knowledge.
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The crisis of classical rationality, which became inevitable at the turn of the 19th and 
20th centuries, radically changed the understanding of the object field and methods of 
philosophical cognition [1]. First of all, it became obvious that metaphysics “had come to 
an end”, and even those philosophers who tried to defend metaphysics against the attacks 
of “critical thinking” in order to restore it as a “strict science” were compelled to consider 
this fact [2]. In addition, the task of philosophical cognition was more and more often 
believed to be a creative modelling of possible reality rather than grasping the invariant 
universal truth corresponding to the genuine reality [3]. Thus, in the early 20th-centu-
ry philosophy there appeared two main tendencies which determined the specificity of 
philosophical research, namely: the construction of non-metaphysical philosophy, and the 
justification of philosophy as problem knowledge.
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In Russian philosophy of the 20th century, these tendencies were also decisive, despite 
the fact that they are often ignored, especially when historians try to reduce the complex 
process of development of the philosophical culture in Russia to one or another dominat-
ing tradition, whether it be religious or Marxist. In this regard, it is of interest to point out 
a coincidence, which is very significant and by no means accidental, between the views of 
the supporters of both religious and Marxist interpretations of Russian philosophy. This 
coincidence can be seen in the irreverent attitude to the position of Russian positivism. 
Indeed, both religious and Marxist historians of Russian philosophy claim that positivism, 
in spite of its being popular among the Russian philosophizing intellectuals of the Silver 
Age, cannot be considered as real philosophy and, therefore, as a tradition belonging to 
the philosophical culture of Russia [4]. Obviously, the main reason for this negative atti-
tude toward Russian positivism should be explained by the fact that the positivist thinkers 
tried to change the very essence of philosophical discourse. This resulted in discrediting 
the “eternal” questions of philosophy, on the one hand, and in treating philosophy as an 
art of life rather than cognition of the objective reality, on the other [5].
To begin with, let us consider Russian positivism by means of analyzing the two main 
“irritants” of the philosophical tradition: antimetaphysical pathos and a new model of 
knowledge. Then the idea of de-anthropologized knowledge, one of the central in empiri-
ocriticism in its Russian version, will become clear.
1. Criticism of the metaphysical rationality
Metaphysics, as an object of criticism of the Russian positivists, is a special strategy 
of comprehending absolute truth. Historically, the notion of absolute truth, like the ways 
of its objectification, can change, but the belief of philosophers that they do have an “ac-
cess to reality” remains unchanged, which turns the philosophers into metaphysicians. 
It is necessary, therefore, to analyze the possibility of this access, or, what is the same, to 
explore the “metaphysical feeling” — the sixth sense of the thinking person. This is what 
the Russian positivists do, first of all, showing in the end that the “secret” of metaphysics 
is simple: it consists in dualism.
Dualism is a convenient means of presenting things, a well-known way of explaining 
what is given in experience by appealing to what is beyond any experience; as a result of it, 
things in existence are interpreted as being related to their a priori essences. The dualistic 
explanation of what exists, if we consider it as a mechanism for producing objectivity, 
boils down to the following: the actual and meaningful content of experience (what we are 
dealing with here and now, which is important for our life) is endowed with an attribute 
of truth (or lie) by means of the instance of Truth, which is claimed to be ever beyond 
experience and, therefore, which can never be actualized because it intrinsically differs 
from those things that are subject to knowledge. It turns out that the foundation of our 
knowledge always lies in ignorance, and this ignorance is a sine qua non-condition for any 
cognition. Strange as it may seem, the possibility and development of our knowledge de-
pend directly on the assumption that we know that there is unknowable. The unknowable 
world of “things-in-themselves”, thus, enables the cognizability of “things-for-us”, and its 
unknowability is something quite obvious, understandable and necessary.
Dualism, as a method of metaphysical cognition, necessarily requires the ontologiza-
tion of the cognized and the unknowable, as a result of which the content of knowledge 
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and its condition are considered as isolated from the process of cognition. According to 
the Russian positivists, the main drawback of dualism, namely the inevitability of divid-
ing things into two essentially different parts that do not overlap, leads to a number of 
negative consequences: for example, the world breaks up into the realm of ideas and the 
system of things, man is believed to consist of a soul and a body, natural sciences are op-
posed to the humanities. Metaphysics, based on a dualistic interpretation of what exists, 
also implies the ontologization of this interpretation, and the order of ideas is declared to 
be identical with the order of things: the way we perceive things determines what they re-
ally are, therefore, the external world is cognized only through its ideal representation in 
thought. As a result, the being of things is interpreted through thinking, that is, through 
its rational transcription, or rather, abstraction.
Thus, metaphysics described by the Russian positivists is such a system of knowledge 
that is based on ignorance, that is, on a whole series of assumptions which have been ac-
cepted on faith and are never verifiable, and these assumptions, being hypothetical, are 
groundlessly claimed to be apodictic. In this respect, metaphysical thinking is rather sim-
plistic, as it exclusively deals with itself. Moreover, the inability to cognize what really 
exists is characterized by metaphysicians as their “access to reality”. It is no wonder that 
there appeared a fictitious picture of the world — the result of metaphysical work, logically 
consistent but with no cognitive value.
Metaphysical rationality, as Vladimir Lesevich put it, does not have any grounds in 
reality and does not know the limits of its activity. Metaphysics should be regarded as re-
ferring to poetic creativity rather than to philosophy, since “only poetic works are written 
to express one idea and are created by one person” [6, p. 239]. Metaphysical systems must 
be treated, therefore, as works of art, which can make our life more interesting but fail to 
help us cognize it. It is, of course, no accident that the language used by metaphysicians 
to describe their doctrines abounds in literary devices such as allegories and metaphors. 
Indeed, metaphors and allegories are appropriate only in the case where the author tries 
to express his unique, subjective experience rather than objective reality. “Subjective 
speculation constructs a lot of bold, complicated, harmonious and majestic systems in 
which even the most contradictory facts become consistent with the basic principle” [7, 
p. 59]. The creative work of a metaphysician goes on as follows: “the abstract concepts 
are stealthily objectified, the words are taken for the very objects and, thus, there appears 
a whole series of realized abstractions, such as essence, ultimate goal, first cause, etc.” 
[7, p. 59].
According to Aleksandr Bogdanov, metaphysical rationality can hardly be philosoph-
ical; rather, it should be characterized as vulgar because the metaphysician dealing with 
solving “ultimate” questions cannot go without the commonplace distinction between the 
“higher” and the “lower”, etc. It is obvious that the very “concept of the ‘absolute’ is com-
pletely fictitious, because the content of concepts is taken only from experience, and in 
experience there is not and cannot be anything absolute” [8, p. 153]. The truths which are 
really cognized and which to determine the existence of man cannot be absolute: they are 
“living organizing forms of experience”, therefore they should not only be “discovered” or 
“grasped”, they should rather be a guideline in human activity, “lead” people, provide them 
“a fulcrum in the life struggle” [9, p. 219]. The vital meaning of truth is not determined by 
the fact that it is eternal or unchanging, it is determined by the fact that truth can be a goal 
for joint action and at the same time an instrument for achieving this goal. And just as 
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the last goal would signify the end of the movement, and hence the end of life, so the last, 
absolute truth would signify the end of thinking, creative activity of man [10; 11].
From the point of view of Pavel Yushkevich, metaphysics is a natural product of 
“substantial thinking”. This kind of thinking is characterized primarily by the fact that it 
is based on faith in the substance — the “artistic symbol” created by the primitive man 
for the purpose of systematizing a rather limited range of phenomena, namely his ex-
periments with solids. Thus, “substantialism is, primarily, the ideology of solids, the ide-
ology of tactile perceptions developed into the Absolute” [12, p. 145], and the limits of 
its applicability are determined by the degree of primitiveness of human experience. So, 
for everyday life, the metaphysics of substantialism is quite suitable, since it represents 
what exists in its finite definiteness, and the world as a whole — as a logically ordered 
system of things or a picture. Due to the metaphysics of substantialism man acquires 
that “simplicity of view” which enables him to see something eternal, “genuine” in the 
ever-changing and diverse world. However, for philosophical reflection, metaphysical 
thinking is unacceptable because it focuses exclusively on grasping the “genuine” and 
therefore loses sight of the actual content of experience. Pavel Yushkevich contrasted 
metaphysical substantialism with philosophical “constantism” which he considered 
such an approach to the interpretation of what exists that would make it possible to cre-
ate an appropriate picture of the world in its dynamics. That is, this world picture should 
reflect, on the one hand, the ontological unity of being, and on the other, the relativity 
and infinity of its cognition.
2. The project of problem knowledge
Practically all those philosophers in Russia who accepted empiriocriticism and criti-
cized the dualistic metaphysics for its being unable to contribute to philosophical cogni-
tion developed alternative projects and tried to prove the possibility of monistic philoso-
phy. The most interesting experiments of constructing a system of “non-metaphysical all-
unity” were the theories of empiriomonism and tektology of Aleksandr Bogdanov [9; 13], 
scientific philosophy of Vladimir Lesevich [6], empiriosymbolism of Pavel Yushkevich 
[12], philosophy of life of Sergey Suvorov [14], as well as positive aesthetics of Aleksandr 
Lunacharsky [15]. These theories, despite their having much in common, including the 
basic assumptions and principal conclusions, were quite diverse. However, each of them 
was an attempt at modelling a system of new, non-classical knowledge. If we summarize 
the ideas expressed by the Russian positivists in this respect, we can see that all of them 
considered philosophical knowledge as a “problem” one.
Describing philosophy as a “problem” knowledge, it is first of all necessary to pay at-
tention to the specificity of the concept “problem”. It is well known that in formal logic the 
problem is defined as the situation determined by the two factors: 1) the question raised 
for inquiry or solution cannot be answered or solved; 2) this question should be solved 
at all costs. Consequently, the problematic situation implies the urgency of the question 
posed, on the one hand, and the inability to find the appropriate answer, on the other. In 
philosophy, the problem is also understood as the lack of a solution; however, this lack is 
not be regarded as a shortcoming of philosophical knowledge. Quite the contrary, it is due 
to the inability to find the appropriate answer to the question that this question becomes 
philosophical. This means that the problem posed for inquiry is valuable as itself and does 
Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2019. Т. 35. Вып. 1 111
not involve the search for final solutions; moreover, the very idea of such solutions pre-
vents from any philosophical investigation.
The “problem” character of philosophy, as the Russian positivists understood it, first 
of all implies the refusal to aim at absolute knowledge. They believed that “the age of world 
picture” had passed as it became obvious long ago that the world we live in and try to cog-
nize is not equivalent to what exists and is called reality, no matter as reality is considered: 
empirically — as a set of phenomena existing here and now; transcendentally — as the 
realization of a priori forms of cognition; metaphysically — as a system of eternal ideas or 
essences. A fundamental characteristic of reality is that it is a process, therefore, the reality 
is principally uncompleted and open for creative activity of man. Philosophical cognition 
of reality became a matter of great difficulty as soon as philosophers had realized that the 
world is ever changeable, not stable. Obviously, in order to grasp the changeable, it is nec-
essary to proceed from the primacy of what will possibly be over what does exist now. It is 
what will possibly be but does not exist now that determines the essence of what really is; 
thus, reality is always projective, it is interpreted from the point of view of the future, for 
only in this case reality can be rationally systematized to be appropriate for man to live as 
a human being.
Having taken into consideration the projective character of philosophical cognition, 
the Russian positivists called for a greater focus on the very questions, or problems, rather 
than their solutions. In their opinion, a philosophical inquiry should begin with posing 
questions correctly so that they will stay actual and conscious. Neither the Absolute nor 
eternal essences should be the subject matter of philosophy. Accordingly, philosophers 
should cease to explain the world or justify the existing cultural, religious, aesthetic and 
other values by means of constructing metaphysical doctrines. What they are able and 
ought to do is to propose and substantiate various projects of reality.
3. Man as a problem of philosophy
The “overcoming” of metaphysics and the understanding of philosophy as “problem” 
knowledge made it possible to ground a new perspective for interpreting the concept of 
“man”, which is fundamental to the world outlook of classical rationalism [16]. Man has 
become a problem: this means that, firstly, the anthropocentric principle of interpreting 
what exists has ceased to be the determining factor of philosophical thinking, since man 
and the subject of cognition has been distinguished; secondly, man has “lost” the ontologi-
cal grounds enabling him to notice “the genuine in himself ”, for example such essential 
characteristics as “universality”, “ahistoricity”, “autonomy”, “self-sufficiency”, “uncondi-
tional value”; thirdly, man has realized his “derivativeness” and “finiteness”, he has learned 
to look at himself “from the outside” and got an opportunity for a projective, or creative, 
existence.
Man taken as a problem of philosophy points primarily to the fact that the model of 
subjectivity formed in the classical rationalistic philosophy has failed to play its role as 
a pillar of philosophical cognition and guarantor of true judgments concerning things; 
moreover, this model which is still being used by philosophers represents an obstacle to 
philosophical thinking [17]. According to the Russian positivists, such Cartesian model 
of man as res cogitans, corresponding to the requirements of the scientific discourse of 
the classical era, makes it very difficult to understand the key moments of reality and, 
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therefore, should be discarded. However, the destruction of the Cartesian subjectivity and 
the critical analysis of the discourse that gave rise to the corresponding interpretation of 
man is just a preliminary, albeit necessary, condition for positive philosophy. The main 
task of criticism of the historically formed ideas about man consists in the justification of 
the need for an “empty”, or de-anthropologized, space for philosophical thought develop-
ment. In other words, the task of criticizing the classical subjectivity is to undermine the 
persuasiveness of the traditional interpretations of man in order to prove the relativity, or 
conventionality, of any, including positivistic, subject theories.
Obviously, if the task of criticism was only to show the falsity of the model of man 
elaborated in the paradigm of classical rationalism, it would be possible to hope that the 
essence of man may be discovered and represented correctly sometime in the future. 
In this case, the Cartesian subject theory would be criticized as only a hindrance to the 
proper perception of what exists as if it was possible to break the laws of “anthropological 
sleep”; the classical model of man would be identified with a distorting “mirror of nature”, 
etc. Therefore, it would seem conceivable that after the hindrance was removed, the phi-
losopher could find an appropriate approach to grasping the true essence of man, on the 
one hand, and the genuine reality, on the other. However, the Russian positivists insisted 
that there is an irremovable obstacle to philosophical cognition — that one which should 
be taken into account when constructing a world picture. This obstacle is the man him-
self, that is, the actual subject theory which precedes and determines any philosophical 
investigation. Since it is impracticable to avoid it, the philosopher should proceed from 
the assumption that the subject theory he adheres to is really valid for cognition and at the 
same time it is merely a creative fiction which is necessary to be exposed as a false state-
ment. Such an acceptance- rejection of the subject theory will help consider reality as a 
process, in its dynamics.
4. The “death” of man
Describing the “empty”, or de-anthropologized space as a sine qua non-condition 
for philosophical reflection, the Russian positivists relied upon the thesis of the “death” of 
man — one of the central statement, which each of them tried to develop in their own way. 
They argued that in order to correctly raise the question what man is one should proceed 
from the fact of the finiteness of man. Here we can see the influence of F. Nietzsche, whose 
well-known aphorism “God is dead” pronounced by a “mad man” [18, p. 593] provoked a 
number of fruitful discussions among the Russian positivists who developed this statement 
and proposed their own ideas (in particular, the thesis of the “death” of God became the 
theoretical basis for the doctrine of God-Building, and the thesis of the “death” of man was 
interpreted to ground the concept of a “new” personality) [19, p. 170–179]. In addition, the 
criticism of the moral interpretation of the world and man, initiated by F. Nietzsche, ena-
bled the Russian positivists to overcome the traditional philosophical view that the essence 
(nature) of a thing is more fundamental and immutable than its existence (the mere fact of 
its being). As a result, they came to the conclusion that existence precedes essence and is, 
therefore, more essential. Thus, what is called and really is “man” is determined by random 
existential factors, such as, for example, various “perspectives” dealt with the realization of 
the “will to power”, the confrontation between different “interests” or “needs”, etc. It is due 
to the fact that it is impossible to anticipate every contingency that these factors can be re-
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garded as necessary; in this respect, contingency plays here a key role, so it can be identified 
with the cause of necessity. Indeed, only what has happened to exist necessarily is because it 
happened to be this way and not otherwise; what has happened, or become, is irreversible 
and therefore necessary. Moreover, what has happened to exist is always unique. As some-
thing unique, it is finite, on the one hand, and ineffable, on the other.
Man as something which came into being by chance and therefore necessarily exists 
as a unique creature is known to be capable of self-reflection. Due to this ability, a man 
reveals himself as a problem as soon as he renounces the traditional habit of “thinking 
only in the form of speech” [20, p. 296], that is, of determining what exists including his 
own being by appealing to a priori essences or ideas. Man is considered a problem be-
cause when describing himself as “the being of becoming” he has to somehow define him-
self, and each time when he does it, he thereby distinguishes himself from what has been 
grasped in the self-definition, demonstrating the impossibility of any appropriate defini-
tion whatsoever. A man reflecting upon his own essence, therefore, is not fundamentally 
what he is. He “dies” as soon as he declares his “being”.
The thesis of the death of man leads to the idea that man turns out to be somebody 
else — the other one who essentially differs from what has been defined as his essence in 
the act of self-knowledge. It should be stressed that the variable “otherness” of the man like 
his invariant “being” cannot be properly defined either. Moreover, it can not be grasped 
from an outside perspective, because neither the “honoured interlocutor” [21] nor “the 
Other” [22] will guarantee the cognition of man as the other one. Thus, the image of 
the otherness is created each time anew by means of a number of random factors. The 
problem of man, therefore, proves to be both the problem of identity and the problem of 
otherness. As a result, man is considered as an existential variable, or as a function of the 
place he occupies.
When discussing the functional status of man, the Russian positivists, on the one 
hand, relied on the ideas of European philosophers, primarily F. Nietzsche and K. Marx 
[23]. The latter, for example, defined the essence of man as “the aggregate of all social rela-
tions” [24, p. 3]; this was interpreted to prove that the essence of man as determined by the 
social and historical conditions is part of the everlasting process of renovation, regenera-
tion, transformation and metamorphosis. On the other hand, in Russia at the end of the 
19th century, there was a much philosophical debate on the problem of subjectivity which 
continued until the era of official Marxism-Leninism. These are some key positions to 
be mentioned: A. I. Vvedensky’s works initiated intensive discussions on issues dealt with 
“the other’s I” [25; 26]; M. M. Bakhtin paid attention to the dangerous gap between “the 
two worlds, absolutely unconnected and not permeable to each other: the world of culture 
and the world of life” [22, p. 7] and tried to bridge this gap with the help of his “philosophy 
of action” implying the necessity to take into account the “unique singularity of the lived 
life” [22, p. 7]; finally, V. I. Vernadsky in his doctrine of biosphere and noösphere criticized 
the philosophical theories proceeding from the view on man as a self-sufficient creature 
which essentially differs from both natural phenomena and other living beings on the 
Earth; V. I. Vernadsky stressed the “functional dependence of man as a natural object, and 
humanity as a natural phenomenon, on the environment of their life and thought” [27, 
p. 13] and concluded that since man can not be correctly understood outside the context 
of his existence, he should be regarded as a function of the biosphere and studied together 
with its habitat.
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5. De-anthropologized cognition
The problem approach to understanding man involves a specific way of research. Ob-
viously, as soon as philosophers agree that there are no essential characteristics of man, 
they have to renounce their attempts of systematic research. Therefore, instead of positive 
knowledge about man they will be only able to draw up some philosophical declarations. 
Indeed, it seems impossible to philosophically cognize man when his essence is constantly 
changing. A skeptical conclusion that man is beyond philosophical cognition is likely to 
be inevitable.
However, the Russian positivists did not make up such a conclusion as they believed 
that it was necessary to resist skepticism and agnosticism by all means. First of all, they 
insisted that the statement that philosophical cognition of man aimed at discovering his 
essence is obviously fictitious does not prove the falsity of cognition of any kind. The criti-
cism of metaphysical approaches helps only to understand that man has no ahistorical 
essence, which would completely determine his existence. Therefore, it is man’s existence, 
not his essence that should be cognized. That is, the analysis of the various forms of man’s 
existence determined by historical, social, cultural and other factors will make it possible 
to conceive what man really is. This means, inter alia, that man is to be studied primarily 
on the basis of the past, or on the basis of the time-tested forms of his existence.
On the one hand, every concrete form of subjectivity is historically determined and 
can not therefore be considered an adequate manifestation of the essence of man. On the 
other hand, every concrete form of subjectivity due to the fact that it has already come 
into being is likely to shed light on what man is. In this respect, what happened to come 
into being can be regarded as a realized possibility to exist, therefore, we can cognize man 
in the perspective of this realized possibility. The more forms of man’s existence are taken 
into consideration, the more we can know what man is regardless of these forms. Thus, ob-
jectifying the content of the concept “man” is a difficult but not insurmountable challenge. 
To put it another way, a philosophical investigation of man is kind of studying the “tracks” 
that he leaves in history rather than grasping his eternal essence. Philosophical research 
resembles telling by the tracks because we study what has already become real and, there-
fore, really refers to the essence of man. It is important, however, not to try to get a com-
plete knowledge of what man is. Each track helps to cognize something essential about the 
man, and at the same time, it distorts his essence. For example, the Cartesian subjectivity, 
if taken as the adequate model of human being, is certainly an obstacle to philosophical 
knowledge, and therefore, it should be necessarily criticized so that we could correctly 
raise the question of man’s essence. However, the same Cartesian subjectivity, if under-
stood in the context of the corresponding interpretation of man’s existence, enables us 
to understand something essential about the man, namely his ability to construct such a 
picture of the world in which man will be an autonomous transcendental subject.
To conclude, the philosophical knowledge of man is made up of the sum of all the 
concepts which were formulated in order to explain the corresponding images of the man 
that existed before. It is nothing more than a systematized collection of man’s “tracks” 
in history or, as the Russian positivists put it, “constructing man” [28], the only possible 
“objective” knowledge of his “essence”. Described as objective, this knowledge is not un-
derstood as made up of hard facts that come from consensus built over time. Following 
F. Nietzsche’s thesis that there are no facts, only their interpretations [20, p. 281], the Rus-
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sian positivists regarded the historically determined images of man as such data which can 
and should be interpreted in different ways. Moreover, they stressed that what is called a 
fact is actually a series of multiple interpretations. As dealt with the present, they refer to 
the existing self-description of man, make it clear what man is considered to be; as dealt 
with the past, they help to know for sure what man happened to be. For example, the 
Cartesian subject can be regarded, on the one hand, as an appropriate characteristic of the 
corresponding epoch and metaphysical views, on the other, as a product of the actual his-
torical and philosophical discourse; both approaches to the Cartesian subject are equally 
entitled to exist.
Since the historical data can be understood in different ways depending on how and 
for what they are actualized in the present, the history turns out, the Russian positivists 
believed, to be fundamentally variable. Due to the variability of history, there can be seen 
a continuum of interpretations in a limited number of facts. When systematizing the im-
ages of the man, which were characteristic for the past eras, we construct man as if he 
had an ahistorical essence. Thus, if we are able to understand subjectivity the way it was 
supposedly understood in some remote era, or if we are able to describe the functional 
status of man determining the corresponding interpretation of what exists, then we are 
likely to know something essential in man as such. The adequacy of interpretation of his-
torical data, as it follows from the above, is not to be taken into account: since this or that 
interpretation has appeared, then the subjectivity dealt with it has already become a fact.
Finally, since cognition of man is possible only on the basis of the forms of his exist-
ence in history, philosophy is considered only as a history of philosophy. It is no accident 
that the followers of positivism in Russia paid much attention to the interpretation of the 
historical and philosophical process, proving that their position had resulted from the 
logical development of all thinking humanity [29; 30]. Indeed, in case the problem ap-
proach to understanding knowledge is realized, the historical past becomes the material 
for multiple interpretations, and “constructing man” is taken as the aim of philosophical 
cognition. In this respect, the attempts to study man as he functioned before are attempts 
of interpreting the essence of man in the context of his possible existence in the future. 
Philosophy as such a history of philosophy which is aimed at constructing man is obvi-
ously de-anthropologized.
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Философия как деантропологизированное познание: 
идеи русского эмпириокритицизма
А. Е. Рыбас
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет,  
Российская Федерация, 199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., 7–9
Для цитирования: Рыбас А. Е. Философия как деантропологизированное познание: идеи рус-
ского эмпириокритицизма // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конф- 
ликтология. 2019. Т. 35. Вып. 1. С. 107–118. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2019.109 (In English)
В статье анализируется проблемный подход к пониманию человека, который был ха-
рактерен для русских эмпириокритиков рубежа XIX–ХХ вв. Показано, что этот подход 
предполагает возможность процессуального осмысления предметности философско-
го познания, что, в свою очередь, требует критического преодоления метафизической 
рациональности. Проблематика русского позитивизма рассматривается посредством 
анализа двух основных «раздражителей» философской традиции: антиметафизиче-
ского пафоса и новой модели познания. Метафизика как объект критики русских по-
зитивистов представляла собой особую стратегию постижения абсолютной истины, 
или же такую систему знания, которая была основана на незнании, т. е. на целом ряде 
допущений, принятых на веру и  исключающих возможность какой-либо проверки. 
Рассматриваются наиболее интересные попытки создания философии «неметафизиче-
ского всеединства»: эмпириомонизм и тектология А. А. Богданова, научная философия 
В. В. Лесевича, эмпириосимволизм П. С. Юшкевича, философия жизни С. А. Суворо-
ва и позитивная эстетика А. В. Луначарского. Эти теории анализируются в контексте 
моделирования системы нового, неклассического, или же деантропологизированного 
философского познания. Суть деантропологизации сводится к  устранению субъект-
объектной диспозиции как исходной посылки философии и к  рассмотрению субъ-
ективности как множества историко-культурных форм, сопряженных с соответству-
ющими теоретико-метафизическими конструктами объективной реальности. При 
таком подходе человек утрачивает традиционно приписываемые ему субстанциаль-
ные характеристики и рассматривается исходя из его существования, а не сущности, 
а субъект-объектная диспозиция понимается как один из исторически обусловленных 
способов интерпретации сущего. Другими словами, человек осмысляется как «пробле-
ма», которая требует решения, но принципиально не может быть разрешена. Проблема 
человека раскрывается посредством деструкции и актуализации его основных исто-
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рических определенностей. Обосновывается положение русских позитивистов о том, 
что философия может существовать только в форме историко-философского дискур-
са, который ведется не с целью воссоздания существовавших философских учений, а 
с целью творческого моделирования возможной действительности.
Ключевые слова: русская философия, позитивизм, проблема человека, субъект, де-
струкция субъективности, собирание человека, деантропологизированное познание.
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